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In the past two decades, organizational scholars have focused significant attention on how organizations 
manage crises. While most of these studies concentrate on crisis prevention, there is a growing emphasis on 
crisis response. Because information that is critical to crisis response may become outdated as crisis conditions 
change, crisis response research recognizes that the management of information flows and networks is critical 
to crisis response. Yet despite its importance, little is known about the various types of crisis information networks 
and the role of IT in enabling these information networks. Employing concepts from information flow and social 
network theories, this paper contributes to crisis management research by developing four crisis response 
information network prototypes. These networks are based on two main dimensions: (1) information flow 
intensity and (2) network density. We describe how considerations of these two dimensions with supporting case 
evidence yield four prototypical crisis information response networks: Information Star, Information Pyramid, 
Information Forest, and Information Black-out. In addition, we examine the role of IT within each information 
network structure. We conclude with guidelines for managers to deploy appropriate information networks 
during crisis response and with suggestions for future research related to IT and crisis management. 
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1. Introduction 
The occurrence of several large-scale natural disasters in the past two decades -- e.g., the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome pandemic, Hurricane Katrina, Asian Tsunami disasters and the Swine 
Flu epidemic -- has attracted significant public attention and ignited interest among researchers 
(Thomas & Fritz, 2006; Weick, 1993; Lin, Zhao, Ismail, & Carley, 2006; Junglas & Ives, 2007; 
Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007; Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980; Van de Walle, 
Van Den Eede, & Muhren, 2009; Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney, & Pearson, 1989; Quarantelli, 2001; 
Rubin, Amlôt, Page, & Wessely, 2009). While extensive work has focused on preventing crises under 
the assumption that crises are avoidable (Augustine, 1995; Kash & Darling, 1998; Salmon, 1993), the 
recognition that poor crisis response can result in a humanitarian catastrophe of far larger magnitude 
than the damage caused by the original event itself (Junglas & Ives, 2007; Hynes & Prasad, 1997) is 
leading to a growing body of research emphasizing crisis response (Leidner, Pan, & Pan, 2009; Hiltz, 
Van de Walle, & Turoff, 2010). 
 
One element of crisis response that is particularly important to large-scale disasters is that of 
information flow and network management (Housel, El Sawy, & Donovan, 1986). Managing information 
flows is critical in crisis situations because decision making is bounded by time urgency, and information 
may become outdated as the crisis conditions change (Majchrzak et al., 2007; Hale, 1997). 
Furthermore, decision makers face the challenges of information overload; the availability of fewer 
communication channels; and the omitting, delaying, and filtering of information, and processing of 
incorrect information during crises by intermediate message-handling units (Nunamaker, Weber, & 
Chen, 1989; Sniezek, Wilkins, Wadlington, & Baumann, 2002). To cope with crises in an efficient and 
highly coordinated manner, updated crisis information must be allowed to flow vertically and horizontally 
among crisis response organizations in a rapid manner (Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005). 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the different approaches to structuring information networks during 
crisis response and to investigate the role of IT in these information networks. Drawing upon concepts 
from information flow and network theory, we use a comparative case study of the responses to four 
major societal crises to develop four prototypical crisis information response networks. The two main 
dimensions of our framework are (1) information flow intensity and (2) network density. Our 
prototypical networks provide a basis for further research into IT and crisis response and allow 
practitioners to understand the development and use context of the information networks they 
implement during crisis response. 
 
Our paper is organized as follows: we begin with a review of information flow and network research. 
We then present our research method and cases. We conduct within-case and cross-case analyses. 
Our implication focuses on the role of IT in crisis response information networks. Finally, we present 
some research and practical implications. 
2. Theoretical Foundation: Information Flow and Information 
Networks 
Information flow is an important topic in several streams of organizational research, including 
organization design (Te’eni, 2001), supply chains (Sahin & Robinson, 2002), and social networks. The 
latter stream of work is particularly relevant to crisis response situations because responding agencies 
are often not a single organization but multiple organizations with varying degrees of pre-existing 
relationships. The network of responding agencies must be quickly assembled and coordinated. Social 
network research distinguishes networks according to the type and level of ties (i.e., individual, 
organizational, and institutional) comprising the network (Bell & Zaheer, 2007; Suarez, 2005). Existing 
ties, be they individual, organizational, or institutional, imply a well-established, trust-based relationship 
(Krovi, Chandra, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Pan & Pan, 2006). The strength of the ties depends on several 
factors such as the amount of time spent together, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, the reciprocal 
services associated with the relationship (Granovetter, 1973), the sense of belonging, and the 
perception of the actor’s role importance (Hahn, Moon, & Zhang, 2008; Pan & Pan, 2011). The diffusion 
of information – e.g., information flow -- is influenced by network ties. The degree to which network ties 
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influence the information flow depends on whether the ties are strong or weak. Strong ties are likely to 
promote high quality information transfer between parties and serve as effective conduits of information 
(Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999), especially among formalized 
networks (Ghoshal, Korine, & Szulanski, 1994; Granovetter, 1973; Levin & Cross, 2004; Pan, Pan, 
Chen, & Hsieh, 2007; Tan, Pan, & Hackney, 2010). Weak ties, however, may provide access to 
information only in outer social circles but may provide a large amount of information (Granovetter, 
1973). Generally in an organizational setting, it is important to establish strong ties among actors in 
order to enhance team performance (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996) and to establish 
weak ties in order to promote innovation (Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2005). 
 
In a crisis situation, there is no time for the time-consuming process of developing and nurturing close 
ties; rather, responders must draw upon their existing ties but also quickly establish new ties. The ties 
are part of a complex network of responders. For example, in a typical response to a hurricane in the 
state of Florida, more than 300 responders from 50 different agencies will be activated, each with 
different specialized expertise (Xia, Becerra-Fernandez, Gudi, & Rocha, 2011). Given the large 
number of responders and agencies involved, the structural complexity of the response network is 
very high (Xia et al., 2011). Consequently, one essential element concerning information flow in crisis 
response is the design of a structure of information flow among agencies that ensures proper flow of 
information to and from the relevant agencies. We refer to this structure of information flow in crisis 
response as the crisis response network. 
 
Among the key activities of the crisis response network is to ensure that resources are effectively and 
efficiently allocated to the affected individuals. In order to properly collect and allocate resources, 
responders require detailed ground information, detailed information about available resources, and 
detailed logistics information, as well as information about where responders are located and their 
access to resources. It is the responsibility of the central responding agency – the agency that 
oversees the coordination of all other responding agencies – to establish the protocols for collecting, 
storing, sharing, and distributing information (Pan, Pan & Devadoss, 2005). Traditionally, disaster 
planners and managers have advocated top-down, centralized command and control during 
emergency situations (Moynihan, 2008; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997). However, some have argued 
that the centralized command and control may not be a good model (Lin et al., 2006). Because the 
detailed information must move at a rapid pace and across a variety of sources, existing information 
channels and routines are often too slow, disconnected, and inadequate to meet the needs of crisis 
information flow (Majchrzak et al., 2007). As a result, other forms of crisis response networks may 
need to be considered in order to improve information flow. 
 
Recent work on information flow in crisis response has focused on the impediments to information 
flow (Day, Junglas, & Silva, 2009), identifying seven major impediments to the flow of information 
across a crisis response supply chain network. The seven impediments are data inaccessibility, data 
inconsistency, inadequate stream of information, low information priority, source identification 
difficulty, storage media misalignment, and unreliability (Day et. al., 2009). Technology may play a role 
in overcoming the impediments to information flow. Pivotal in supporting information processing and 
disseminating activities during crisis response are emergency management information systems 
(Hiltz et al., 2010) or crisis information systems. To be effective, crisis information systems ought to 
consider who the participants are, what they aim to achieve, and what the relationships are among 
them (Jul, 2010; Quarantelli, 2005). Emergency management information systems play an active role 
in simplifying data and minimizing filtering, supporting feature matching, reducing cognitive overload, 
directing attention efficiently, reducing confirmation bias, and aiding diagnosis during crisis response 
(McKinney, 2008; Turoff, Van de Walle, & Hiltz, 2009). 
 
Most of the work on IT in crisis response has focused on the role of IT in coordinating information flow 
across responders (Leidner et al., 2009; Manoj & Baker, 2007). Less, if any, attention has been paid 
to the processes of communicating with victims and with the public. Because of the large number of 
potential stakeholders involved, a primary challenge in crisis response is the process of stakeholder 
informing (Leidner et al., 2009; Majchrzak et al., 2007). Indeed, the process of resolute informing is a 
central activity that involves creating new, or modifying existing, communication and information 
channels to ensure the timeliness of information delivery from multiple sources (U.S. National 
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Research Council, 2005), the avoidance of information overload (Turoff, Chumer, Walle, & Yao, 
2004), and the establishment of accountability with fragmented information across stakeholder groups 
(Leidner et al., 2009; Marcus & Nichols, 1999; Chen, Sharman, Rao, Upadhyaya, & Cook-Cottone, 
2010). Recent work suggests that the public sometimes develops its own informing process during 
crises, when it is unable to get what it deems as reliable, timely information from the central 
responding agencies (Day et al., 2009). 
 
The above review of the literature on information flow during crisis response suggests that information 
flow is an essential element of crisis response and that the effectiveness of the crisis response network 
will be influenced by the role of the central responding agency, the role of IT in helping coordinate the 
diverse agencies involved, and the means of communication with stakeholders. Yet the literature is not 
specific on the different types of crisis response networks or how the network type influences information 
flow. Our study addresses these issues. Using case studies of the information processes developed 
during the crisis response activities following four independent crises, our study will uncover different 
structures of information networks that result in varying degrees and intensity of information flow. 
3. Research Approach 
We adopted a qualitative research approach with a multiple case design in order to ensure exposure 
to different forms of crisis information networks. The selection of the cases was guided by the 
principle of theoretical replication (Yin, 1994). We selected and successfully obtained access to two 
case sites and carried out extensive primary data collection. Given the limited access to more crisis 
response case sites, we turned to secondary data collection. We selected cases in extreme situations 
and polar types in which the process of information flow is “transparently observable” (Pettigrew, 
1988). Each of the four cases was contextualized in a large-scale natural disaster setting. The 
organizations involved in this study were comprised of mostly public-sector organizations with only 
one being a private, non-profit organization. While all of these cases have similar characteristics to 
some extent in that they were large-scale natural disasters requiring the involvement of local, 
regional, and national aid organizations, we sought variation in other characteristics to tease out 
further compelling evidence. For example, the approaches to crisis response and information 
management were different across the four cases. Our goal was to expand and generalize theories 
(analytical generalization) rather than to engage in statistical generalization (Yin, 1994; Myers & 
Newman, 2007; Pan & Tan, 2011). The four cases we studied were: the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) crisis in Singapore, the Sri Lanka tsunami crisis, the Cyclone Nargis crisis in 
Burma, and the Hurricane Katrina crisis in the US. The unit of analysis is “network.” The four different 
networks represented in the four cases are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. A Summary of Four Crisis Response Networks 
Data 
Collection 
Information 
Flow 
Name of 
Crisis  
Crisis Response 
Network 
Organizations Involved Date of Crisis 
Occurrence 
Primary High intensity 
and density 
Severe Acute 
Respiratory 
Syndrome 
Crisis 
Singapore 
Government 
Agencies 
Singapore’s Defence 
Science Technology 
Agency, Ministry of 
Health and 12 other 
Government agencies 
March, 2003 
Primary High intensity, 
low density  
Sri Lanka 
Tsunami 
Disaster 
Tzu Chi Voluntary 
Organization, 
Taiwan and its 
Overseas 
Branches 
Tzu Chi Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Host 
Countries’ Voluntary 
Organizations 
December, 2004 
Secondary Low intensity, 
high density 
Cyclone Nagis 
Crisis 
Government of 
Burma & 
International 
Relief 
Organizations 
Burmese Government, 
Red Cross Organization, 
and Several Others 
May, 2008 
Secondary Low intensity, 
low density 
Hurricane 
Katrina Crisis 
US Government 
Agencies 
City, State of Louisiana 
and US Federal 
Government 
August, 2005 
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3.1. Data Collection  
Of the four cases analyzed, we conducted primary data collection in two cases and secondary data 
collection in the other two. For the case of the SARS crisis, field research began in August 2005 at 
one of the working groups participating in the SARS crisis response, Singapore’s Defence Science 
Technology Agency (DSTA). Altogether, we conducted 16 interviews of senior managers and 
members of the crisis response team. For the Sri Lankan tsunami crisis, we interviewed key members 
from Tzu Chi Voluntary Organization (Tzu Chi), a Taiwanese not-for-profit organization that 
participated in the Sri Lanka tsunami disaster relief mission. Altogether, we conducted 18 face-to-face 
interviews between April 2005 and January 2006. The interviewees selected for both cases 
comprised mainly the key members of the crisis response teams. The interviews lasted approximately 
one to one and a half hours each. Crisis management, information flow, and social network theories 
guided the design of the interview questions. 
 
These interviewees represent various “voices” (Myers & Newman, 2007). Gathering different 
perspectives is important for triangulation purpose (Rubin & Rubin, 2005) and to prevent elite bias 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). For both cases, the interviews included a variety of questions concerning 
how crisis information flow was managed during the dire period and the factors that affected the way 
information was disseminated. We inquired about how updated information was published publicly 
and the amount of information organizations were collecting and transmitting during the response 
period. The interviews also included more general questions designed to give interviewees the 
chance to express their opinions on the crisis response experience (refer to Appendix A for excerpts 
of interview topic guides). All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. Summaries were 
generated from the transcribed texts. 
 
For the cases of Cyclone Nagis and Hurricane Katrina, we used secondary documentation from a 
variety of sources as the text to be examined (i.e., major periodicals and information from several 
governmental and private, not-for-profit organizations’ websites that emerged after the disaster 
events). We were inspired by several previous studies that deemed secondary data effective and 
useful in explaining vulnerable and sensitive settings (Cowton, 1998; Davidson, Worrell, & Lee, 1994; 
Barley, Meyer, & Gash, 1988; Church, 2002). Altogether, we identified and studied 37 articles. Refer 
to appendices B and C for the reference details of some of these articles. We focused our data 
collection on articles reporting the relief activities carried out by major crisis responders (e.g., Federal 
Emergency Management Agency; US Department of Health and Human Services; Asean 
Humanitarian Relief Efforts for Victims of Cyclone Nagis) and other media reports on the two crises 
(e.g., New York Times; CNN; The Guardian). Media reports and analyses pertaining to responses to 
both disasters were deemed relevant to our data gathering efforts as they represent a “faithful mirror 
of reality” (Franzosi, 1995, p. 166). We first identified articles with titles or keywords that included 
Cyclone Nagis or Hurricane Katrina. After reading the relevant articles, we highlighted the sentences 
that described the crisis response actions, and the topics that emerged included: what were the 
response strategies and plans, what actions were taken, and who was involved. On several 
occasions, we revisited articles we had analyzed previously and provided linkages to other articles if 
they provided similar reports or analyses (Harris, 2001; Insch, Moore, & Murphy, 1997).  
3.2. Data Analysis 
We carried out data analysis by recursively iterating between the empirical data, the theoretical lens, 
and the relevant crisis management literature. The iteration helped to shape our four emerging 
prototypical crisis response information networks. We continued the iterative process until the state of 
theoretical saturation was reached, that is, when it was possible to comprehensively explain the 
findings of the case study, and no additional data needed to be collected or added to improve the 
developed prototypes (Eisenhardt, 1989). We began our analysis by reading all transcripts and 
documents and highlighting the descriptions that were related to the crisis information flow 
management process. Social network theory sensitized us to the importance of information flow but 
stopped short of indicating the precise characteristics of flow that might be relevant to code. 
Therefore, we used analytic induction (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998) to uncover new constructs and 
relationships that could enrich our understanding of the phenomenon and assist our theory building 
process (Patton, 2002). Analytical induction involved the following steps (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981): 
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(1) defining phenomenon in a tentative manner, (2) scanning data to identify categories, (3) 
developing typologies, (4) determining the relationships that exist among categories, and (5) 
continually refining categories until all are accounted for. Table 2 below summarizes the analytic 
induction procedures adopted in this study. 
 
Table 2. A Summary of the Analytic Induction Procedures Adopted in this Study 
Steps of Analytic Induction Additional Description Illustration (where applicable) 
1 Defining a phenomenon in a 
tentative manner 
Formulating provisional 
statements about the 
phenomenon 
Our review of the literature on information flow 
during crisis response informed the 
importance of information flow during crisis 
response and that the effectiveness of the 
crisis response network will be influenced by 
several attributes. The literature review 
provided the tentative theoretical foundation of 
the phenomenon  
2 Scanning data to identify 
categories 
Creating descriptive codes 
that require little or no 
inference beyond the data 
itself (Miles & Huberman, 
1994) 
We conducted line-by-line coding that helped 
us to focus on the content of the text in the 
line and allowed us to develop our coding 
categories: information flow and direction, and 
network density  
3 Developing typologies  Creating inferential codes that 
pull together data into smaller 
and more meaningful units 
(Punch, 2005) 
We analyzed the coding categories in each 
case and subsequently compared them 
across the four cases. The analysis led us to 
derive four crisis network response 
information structures  
4 Determining the 
relationships that exist 
among categories 
Developing theory or 
statement that helps in 
understanding the 
phenomenon by determining 
the relationships among the 
categories 
We studied the relationships among the 
categories and found that the four information 
network types vary in the amount of 
information the network is able to process 
(information intensity), the direction of the flow 
of the information (top-down vs bottom-up), 
the overall reach of the information (density), 
and in the role of the central organizational 
response agency (refer to Table 5) 
5 Continually refining 
categories and roles until all 
are accounted for  
Data continue to support and 
substantiate the emerging 
categories (Holton, 2007) 
Our iterative process continued until it was 
possible to comprehensively explain the four 
information networks and their structures, and 
no additional data needed to be collected or 
added to improve the developed prototypes  
 
To establish the patterns of information flows among the crisis response organizations, we first listed 
the types of information relevant to the crisis response process (refer to Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Types of Crisis Response Information 
Information Element Crisis Information Content 
Personnel Status Registration of personnel, exact location of personnel, and personnel tracking system. Personnel with first aid and fire rescue experiences 
Infrastructure 
Location of emergency aid equipment. Details of crisis management system 
specifications, e.g., hardware and software. Established physical communication 
networks such as telephone and radio 
Crisis Management and 
Notification 
Emergency plans and organization, emergency preparedness practices, and 
existence of test scenarios. Communications within rescue organizations, such as 
report lines between rescue leader, assistants, rescue personnel, press, and public 
administration  
Area Access Geographical information such as infrastructure, one-way streets, blocked access routes, road barriers, parking, and helicopter landing areas  
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We then developed a list of common themes including information flow speed and network density,  
which dealt with information handling during the crisis response, and two more general categories 
involving stakeholders and resources (Refer to Table 4 below). Speed and volume of information were 
two prominent components of information handling, which we label information intensity. A second 
information-handling category concerns the direction of information flow. Here we looked for evidence 
of information flowing top-down or bottom-up. Based upon the data, we added an unexpected flow, in 
silo, to reflect response networks where information flowed around silos but not across silos. Another 
theme we found repeatedly was network density -- the concentration of nodes in the crisis response 
network. We looked for evidence that indicated the concentration of organizations. 
 
Table 4. Excerpts of Coding Categories 
Category Description Sample Code Category Excerpts of Transcripts 
Stakeholders Variety of 
stakeholders 
involved and 
affected by crisis 
response 
Main responsibility 
Authority 
Hierarchical level 
(a) “a nine-member inter-ministry SARS task force 
was set up with the Home Affairs Minister leading 
the crisis response operation” 
(b) “many foreign aid organizations were made to 
wait anxiously for approval from the Burmese 
Government to deliver loads of emergency 
supplies to the cyclone victims” 
Resources Resources 
deployed during 
crisis response  
Manpower 
Funding  
Equipments and 
vehicles 
IT expertise 
Availability of IT 
infrastructure and 
applications 
(a) “DSTA developed a crisis management system” 
(b) “Tzu Chi mobilizes and coordinates volunteers 
arriving from the Taiwan Headquarters, the host 
countries, and from the neighboring countries” 
(c) “Humanitarian organizations became wary of 
handing over millions of dollars' worth of food and 
equipment to the military government” 
Information 
Flow Intensity 
Speed and volume 
of information 
diffusion during 
crisis response 
Immediate 
Delayed 
Volume 
Frequency 
(a) “the Health Minister of Singapore would provide 
daily updates of SARS outbreak” 
(b) “Tzu Chi relief teams would receive instructions 
and updates of the response progress twice a 
day” 
(c) “Large information had to be drawn from 
hospitals, Ministry of Health, clinics and traditional 
Chinese medicine practitioners” 
(d) “the Burmese Government banned information 
concerning the crisis response situations” 
Network 
Density 
Number of 
intermediate nodes 
in the information 
processing channel 
Information 
intermediaries 
Sources and 
destinations 
(a) “The SARS command center deployed 14 
ministries and statutory boards to combat the 
national crisis” 
Direction of 
Information 
Flow 
The predominant 
transportation 
mode for 
information 
Top-down 
Bottom-up 
In silos 
(a) “Throughout the entire saga, the Junta leaders 
kept information flow to foreign aid organizations 
to a minimum” 
(b) “Bureaucracy slowed the entire relief action and 
initiative. For example FEMA being part of the 
Department of Homeland Security became a layer 
down the hierarchy. All these layers further 
delayed clear crisis response messages being 
sent out early” 
 
Coding categories reflect our interpretations of the information flow management process during crisis 
response. We conducted an initial pilot run for coder training and pilot testing of reliability. During the 
pilot run, we also refined the coding instrument and procedures. To establish the reliability of the 
coding, each coder was asked to quote a particular segment of the relevant texts. Coding was 
conducted independently and without consultation and guidance. We examined the portions of the 
codings where both coders agreed and measured the inter-coder reliability using Cohen’s Kappa 
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coefficient. Our coefficient score of 0.77 suggests substantial agreement between the two coders, and 
the result also demonstrates that the categories were clearly defined and could be located in the text 
with little ambiguity. As the reliability coefficient was high, each coder was subsequently asked to 
code separate portions of the texts. We sorted relevant interview comments and secondary reports 
according to the various categories and developed a list of themes within each category (Harris, 
2001). The list contained the location of each comment on the transcript, the transcript number, the 
interview date, any links to other comments, reports, and sources of news coverage. In addition, we 
looked for evidence in the transcripts that indicated the relativity of our two dimensions. The next step 
in our analysis was to analyze the information flow and direction, network density, stakeholders, and 
resources in each case and, subsequently, compare across the four cases. This led us to derive four 
crisis network response information structures (described in the Within-Case and Cross-Case 
Analysis Sections). In order to reduce researcher bias, a senior colleague was asked to take part in 
early analysis of some of the data. The colleague was uninvolved in the fieldwork and was, therefore, 
unfamiliar with all four cases. The role of this colleague was to bring a different and possibly more 
objective eye to the evidence and detect any bias in data analysis. 
 
Overall, our findings revealed patterns that conformed to the information flow, network, and crisis 
management literature in that the importance of information flow activities was underscored in each 
case, with two providing examples of effective information flow and two providing examples of 
ineffective information flow. But our findings go beyond the existing work by uncovering four crisis 
information network approaches that had yet to be explored in existing crisis management literature. 
The next section presents the background information of the four cases, describes the events that 
happened, and analyzes how information flows and networks were managed during respective crisis 
response operations. 
4. Case Description and Analysis 
4.1. Within-Case Analysis 
For each case, we explain the center of the crisis response operations – its major activities as well as 
how it was organized, the technologies used in support of the center of operations, and the nature of 
communications with stakeholders. These three categories of analysis, derived from our review of the 
literature, enable us to understand what information was gathered by whom (e.g., the activities and 
structure of the center of operations), how the information was gathered and disseminated (the 
technology in support of the center), and with whom the information was shared (the communication 
between the center and stakeholders). 
4.2. Case 1: SARS Crisis – Singapore Government 
The SARS outbreak in March, 2003 was a national health crisis in Singapore. Within two days of 
being notified of the first several cases of the virus, a nine-member inter-ministry SARS task force 
was established to coordinate the crisis response operation. The Minister explained the crisis 
response strategy: “Our national strategy against SARS has three prongs: First, to detect and isolate 
SARS cases as early as possible. Second, to ring-fence detected or suspected cases, hospitals and 
clinics and personnel treating SARS cases and adopt robust screening and infection control 
procedures. Third, to contain the spread of the virus and guard vigilantly against outbreak in the wider 
community.” Initially, the Ministry of Health used an ad-hoc spreadsheet to maintain a list of infected 
patients and potential contacts that were required for medical confinement. Within two weeks, a crisis 
management system was developed to process and distribute information necessary to coordinate 
various crisis response activities across some 14 government agencies. The information included 
hospital contact tracing, daily SARS updates, border control, community contact tracing, and the 
issuance and supervision of home quarantine orders. To develop the case database, information had 
to be drawn from hospitals, the Ministry of Health, clinics, and traditional Chinese medicine 
practitioners. The isolation, preventive, and containment measures the government implemented 
proved highly effective. Although SARS spread rapidly and there was little medical knowledge 
available on how to treat it, Singapore experienced only 238 cases. Within three months of its first 
reported cases, Singapore was removed from WHO's list of SARS-affected countries. 
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4.2.1. Center of Crisis Operations 
In responding to SARS, the Singaporean government set up a SARS command center under the 
direction of the Home Affairs minister supported by 14 government ministries. Various government 
agencies focused on specific informing issues. For example, the Ministry of Health monitored the 
spread of SARS and the movements of individuals who had been exposed to SARS. The Ministry of 
Finance provided the information on Central Provident Fund contributors, which accounts for virtually 
everyone in the Singapore workforce, thereby enabling individuals to be traced from that single 
database. The Ministry of National Development conducted a survey to assess the level of public 
confidence in fighting SARS. The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore issued directives to airlines and 
ensured compliance with SARS preventive measures at the airport. The command center received 
information from these various agencies and then disseminated it to other agencies with little delay. 
4.2.2. Technology Support for the Center of Operations 
To support SARS command center's response activities, the Defense Science and Technology 
Agency (DSTA) developed a crisis management system. The system provided applications to track 
the movement of individuals infected with, or exposed to, SARS. The system captured data on patient 
information, infection status, and relation to other patients or contacts. The information helped 
generate a better understanding of the spread of infection. It allowed for the identification and 
notification of potential people at risk through its linkage to the reference database. The system 
required data from several agencies, including the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the 
Department of Transportation, hospitals, and hospital staff. The agencies worked independently to 
gather information. For example, the Ministry of Health kept track of individuals who had been served 
Home Quarantine orders. Quarantined individuals were required to appear on demand before web-
based cameras plugged into telephone lines. This allowed the Ministry of Health to monitor the 
patients’ compliance with the quarantine orders. DSTA attempted to add continuous improvements 
and functionalities to the system that was built over the course of the first two weeks after the first 
SARS case was identified. The CIO of DSTA commented: “Every night, I would go through the emails 
exchanged by various heads in the government and incorporate their suggestions into the system. It 
was an extremely useful communication mechanism.” 
4.2.3. Communication with Stakeholders 
Data from the crisis management system were used to generate reports that provided the command 
center an accurate update. These updates were provided to the various agency heads, who 
exchanged information, feedback, and suggestions for further actions. Thus, the crisis management 
system developed to support the command center became the central tool to establish information 
flow to and from various agencies. To communicate with the public, the Minister for Health would hold 
a daily press conference to update the nation on SARS crisis. In communicating with the patients and 
the general public, the command center relied heavily on media broadcasts. In collaboration with local 
broadcasting companies, the Ministry of Health launched a free to air channel that focused 
exclusively on SARS. Apart from the latest updates on SARS, it aired re-runs of programs about 
SARS, related cable programs from foreign channel partners, and public education spots that gave 
tips on precautions people could take against SARS. The media acted as a "mediator between the 
government and the public" to keep the public informed about what the government was doing. 
Furthermore, the Feedback Unit, a government agency that coordinates public feedback on 
government policies and measures, gathered feedback from citizens through its online forums. 
Through these manifold information gathering and dissemination actions, the SARS command center 
ensured that corrective measures were openly communicated to all stakeholders. Moreover, the 
command center was able to transcend the political quagmire of multiple agencies, each with a 
separate agenda, creating “tele-cooperation” through the use of information technology. 
4.3. Case 2: Sri Lanka Tsunami Disaster – Tzu Chi Voluntary Organization 
Tzu Chi is a Taiwanese-based private, not-for-profit organization that has been involved in many 
international disaster recovery operations. Known for its rapid mobilization of its volunteers during 
crisis response, Tzu Chi mobilizes and coordinates volunteers arriving from the Taiwan Headquarters, 
the host countries, and from neighboring countries. On December 26, 2004, an earthquake struck 
under the Indian Ocean, 250 kilometers northwest of Indonesia’s Island of Sumatra and triggered a 
tsunami. The tsunami devastated 13 countries’ coastlines, leaving more than 280,000 people dead 
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and millions homeless. Among those countries severely affected was Sri Lanka. More than 35,000 
people were killed and 443,000 people lost their homes in Sri Lanka during the tsunami disaster. The 
overall damage to Sri Lanka was estimated at US $1 billion, with a large proportion of losses 
concentrated in housing, tourism, fisheries, and transportation. In the aftermath of the tsunami, Tzu 
Chi lent its support by collecting and assessing the ground information at Sri Lanka. Following this 
initial situational assessment, Tzu Chi then developed a response plan and set up a relief 
coordination center in Taiwan. 
 
To support the extensive crisis relief activities in Sri Lanka, Tzu Chi had to raise funds. It called on 
volunteers worldwide to donate and appeal for donations. Tzu Chi promoted the fundraising campaign 
and broadcasted updated information about its relief missions at Sri Lanka on its television channel 
“DaAi TV.” Besides television, Tzu Chi also posted daily updates on its website. According to the Sri 
Lanka Tsunami Operational Director: “Many visitors visited our website and in record numbers. Some 
even had trouble, for the first 2-3 days, accessing our site.” Because of its efforts to establish 
transparency and accountability in managing the raised funds, Tzu Chi gained credibility from donors 
and beneficiaries. According to Tzu Chi’s Secretary of Information Integration: “We had a policy of 
updating our website regularly to inform donors how their donations were used, our relief activities, 
and the resources used for each relief mission. By publishing the information publicly and regularly, it 
helped to improve our credibility and earn the donors’ trusts.” Altogether, there were approximately 
57,000 volunteers in Taiwan and 27,000 volunteers in 29 countries that helped raise funds. In Taiwan 
alone, Tzu Chi raised US$14.06 million within two weeks, all of which supported the relief efforts. 
4.3.1. Center of Crisis Operations 
In the case of the tsunami aftermath in Sri Lanka, personnel in Tzu Chi’s headquarters scheduled and 
coordinated the relief efforts on the ground at Sri Lanka. The partner organizations were dependent on 
updated crisis information transmitted by Tzu Chi Headquarters. The hierarchy was relatively flat, with 
headquarters’ personnel working directly with response organizations. Information coordination was 
facilitated by prior relationships formed either in previous joint relief efforts or in annual social meetings. 
Tzu Chi aggregated ground information provided by Tzu Chi crisis relief teams, who collated information 
and needs directly from local community and government representatives. According to Tzu Chi’s 
Secretary of Information Integration: “We acted very fast in gathering the ground information and 
followed the news from local and international media closely. It was crucial to obtain the initial situational 
information since it would determine the way we prepared for relief missions.” The updated crisis 
information and the directives from headquarters helped the ground operation in many ways. According 
to the commander: “It helped to ensure efficient supply of required assets to relief missions, and track 
assets deployed. We also had to move the manpower and high-priority equipment quickly, and establish 
forward operational storage locations to support our ground operations.” 
4.3.2. Technology Support for the Center of Operations 
The telephone and electronic mail were relied upon as the primary communication technologies to aid 
communication between the ground operations and the headquarters. Individuals carrying out 
missions on the ground provided daily information updates. Daily face-to-face meetings were 
conducted to "summarize the relief activities and account for the progress." The progress was then 
reported to the Tzu Chi Headquarters through fax and telephone. A large bulletin board was used on 
site with detailed descriptions of daily operation updates. By consulting the headquarters, decision-
makers on the ground received alternative but feasible options for crisis response. In most 
circumstances, such consultation exercises proved useful since time did not allow for the generation 
of structurally different alternatives on the ground. Tzu Chi adjusted its operational plans frequently to 
suit changing circumstances on the ground. 
4.3.3. Communication with Stakeholders 
Whereas the telephone, fax, and email were the primary communication tools to reach the response 
agencies, the world-wide web was the main communication tool to reach potential donors and 
volunteers. Tzu Chi had a policy of updating its website regularly. According to the Secretary of 
Information Integration: “We had to inform our volunteers and donors of our relief activities, and the 
resources used for the mission. By publishing the information, it helped to improve our credibility and 
earn the donors’ trusts and volunteers’ continued support.” 
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Overall, even though Tzu Chi deployed a less sophisticated set of communication technologies 
relative to the SARS case in Singapore, it was agile in collecting data and establishing an information 
flow that enhanced its speed and effectiveness in deploying its resources during disaster response. 
4.4. Case 3: Hurricane Katrina - USA 
On August 28, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the southern coast of the United States with devastating 
effect, resulting in some 1,800 deaths and more than US$81 billion dollars in damage. In spite of 
warnings from the National Hurricane Center that Katrina was strengthening to a Category Five 
storm, the highest level, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) director, Michael 
Brown, did not order a mandatory evacuation. New Orlean's mayor, Ray Nagin, did declare a state of 
emergency and ordered voluntary evacuation; however, the order came less than 24 hours before the 
hurricane struck in the early morning hours of August 28, and many people, especially the very 
vulnerable, such as those in elderly homes and hospitals, were unable to be evacuated in time. 
 
After Hurricane Katrina struck, the city and state expected federal help in the form of troops to aid in 
the rescue of survivors. However, the federal government refused to send in the troops until the state 
formally requested them. The state request was delayed as a result of the state not immediately 
approving the federal government’s relief plan. According to an observer: “Bureaucracy slowed the 
entire relief action and initiative. For example FEMA being part of the Department of Homeland 
Security became a layer down the hierarchy. All these layers further delayed clear crisis response 
messages being sent out early. No layer is a good layer.” 
 
The scenes that arguably most shocked the world took place at the Superdome and the convention 
center, with thousands of people sleeping in the stadium, restroom facilities overflowing, and garbage 
accumulating. Yet it turned out that neither FEMA’s director nor his boss, Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff, knew about the crisis at the convention center until four days after the hurricane had 
hit Louisiana. Given that the Superdome was the designated shelter for survivors without homes, one 
might presume that those leading the federal relief effort would have received information about the 
squalid conditions of the shelters. But according to Chertoff, "The very day that this emerged in the 
press, I was on a video conference with all the officials, including state and local officials. Strangely none 
of the state and local officials told me about the convention center." Refugees from the hurricane were 
eventually transferred to more viable shelters in other cities and states, but the US government endured 
great criticism for its slow and seemingly disorganized response to the Katrina crisis. 
4.4.1. Center of Crisis Operations 
In the Katrina crisis, there was lack of clarity at the onset concerning which governing body formed 
the center of the response effort. Most looked to FEMA as the center of response operations, but the 
fact that FEMA was embedded within the Department of Homeland Security raised questions about 
who was actually in charge of the disaster response and which department had jurisdictional 
authority.  In addition, being part of the massive, terrorism-focused Department of Homeland Security, 
the director of FEMA, Michael Brown, confessed to having underemphasized its role in natural 
disaster response. 
 
As a result of the confusion concerning what governmental entity was supposed to be coordinating 
the response effort, there were delays in information processing and transmission. The city, state, and 
federal governments were not only internally slow to gather information, partly because they might 
have expected someone else to be gathering the information, they were notoriously ineffective in 
sharing information with other major entities. In fact, there was no central body overseeing the 
sharing of information and there was confusion as to who was responsible for what. 
4.4.2. Technology Support for the Center of Operations  
To make matters worse, Hurricane Katrina crippled most routine telephone and cell phone 
communication because of line breaks, damage to base transceiver stations, and power failures. The 
damaged communication infrastructure left many key emergency response personnel with limited 
means of communicating with one another. In New Orleans, hundreds of police officers were left 
trying to communicate on two radio channels using a back-up system. However, the back-up system 
became overwhelmed due to high volume, resulting in delays before their messages could get 
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through. In addition, telephone lines experienced interruptions or were completely out of service. This 
combination of overwhelmed back-up systems and interrupted phone lines obstructed the flow of 
relief information (Piper & Ramos, 2006). 
4.4.3. Communication with Stakeholders 
Local residents as well as the larger public were highly dependent upon the media for information. But 
the media could not provide the level of detail that the larger public needed: People wanted to know the 
whereabouts of their family and friends who had been impacted by the hurricane, but there was no 
resource to provide this information. In fact, at Red Cross shelters, individuals were registered via a 
paper process, and there was no central electronic database into which the records were put (Day et al., 
2009). In part due to their inability to get relief status information from city officials, some residents took 
matters into their own hands and created their own websites, providing “safe lists” of who was where, 
with whom, and in what condition. The safe lists turned out to be more useful than mass media. 
 
Overall, Hurricane Katrina turned out to be an acid test for managing information flow during crisis 
response. To many, there was information chaos. Instead of a single reporting system to establish a 
uniform information flow to key decision makers, the chaos appeared to be poorly mapped channels 
of information flow at local, state, regional, and federal levels. 
4.5. Case 4: Cyclone Nargis Crisis - Burma 
In May, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Burma, resulting in the death of an estimated 100,000 people. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, many international agencies mobilized to deliver aid to the survivors. However, 
rather than allowing the foreign relief personnel immediate entry into the country, the Burmese 
government -- led by a small group of military generals (the Junta) -- insisted on approving the entry 
of each aid agency and all supplies. As a result, many foreign aid organizations were made to wait 
anxiously for approval from the Burmese government to deliver loads of emergency supplies to the 
cyclone victims. The government even labeled those providing information to the foreign media and to 
Burmese media groups in exile as "saboteurs and destructive elements." 
 
Moreover, Burma’s Foreign Ministry said it would welcome foreign aid but not foreign personnel, 
providing little explanation for this stance. As a consequence, humanitarian organizations became 
wary of handing over millions of dollars' worth of food and equipment to the government. As one 
journalist noted, “The information blackout added a further layer of difficulty in getting an accurate 
picture. The international community received restricted access to the updates in Burma and many 
hundreds of thousands of Burmese and ethnic minority groups were not getting any assistance.” 
Ultimately, in attempting to control the response effort in such a way as to avoid any challenge to its 
own authority, the Burmese government stifled information gathering and dissemination efforts, 
sabotaging well-intentioned aid agencies and denying its people much needed relief. 
4.5.1. The Center of Crisis Operations 
The Burmese government served as its own crisis response center in the aftermath of Cyclone 
Nargis. Fearing that a free flow of information might lead to challenges to its power and authority, the 
government kept tight control over information concerning the crisis. The Junta leaders minimized 
information flow to foreign aid organizations. It also stymied the information flow to, and from, its own 
people in order to prevent stories of slow relief and rehabilitation from reaching the foreign media. 
When the international media began criticizing the Burmese government, it responded by imposing a 
media ban. "The Burmese government was deeply paranoid and isolated," said Derek Mitchell, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
"The prospect of having foreigners in the country they could not control worried them." 
4.5.2. Technology Support of the Operations Center 
The focus of technology by the Burmese government was less on using technology to support the 
relief efforts and more on restricting the use of technology to transmit images and information about 
the disaster to foreigners. As part of the overall media ban, the government cracked down on satellite 
TV receivers, banned newspaper distribution, and banned the airing of TV and radio programs related 
to the cyclone. According to an observer, “The government's crackdown on dealers of satellite 
receivers was an attempt to impose a blackout on the media. The government had also prevented 
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both foreign and domestic journalists from visiting the worst affected areas in the Irrawaddy delta.” 
With the media blackout, the use of blogs and social media sites for the independent gathering and 
dissemination of information began to take hold. Nevertheless, the military government made use of 
its complete control over the country’s Internet gateways to partially shut down Internet access with 
intermittent periods of connectivity and cut off the stream of footage and images of the cyclone’s 
devastation. The military government restricted upload speeds to half the download speeds for 
Internet subscribers and implemented slowdowns in Internet access speeds. It also relied on 
pervasive filtering practices to shape sensitive topics and block independent media and news. 
4.5.3. Communication with Stakeholders 
The strict rules imposed by the Burmese government resulted in a tightly restricted flow of information 
to stakeholders and a highly controlled downward chain of communication. The lack of open 
communication frustrated international aid agencies and the Burmese people and certainly slowed 
down the relief efforts. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon registered his “immense 
frustration” with the pace of relief efforts: “I want to register my deep concern – and immense 
frustration – at the unacceptably slow response to this grave humanitarian crisis. Unless more aid 
gets into the country – very quickly – we face an outbreak of infectious diseases that could dwarf 
today’s crisis.” Instead of focusing all its efforts on helping cyclone victims, the Burmese government’s 
actions proved to be almost as destructive as the storm. 
4.6. Summary 
Our within-case analysis suggests that the four centers of crisis relief operations functioned very 
differently, affecting the way that technology was used to coordinate information flow to and from relief 
agencies, victims, and the general public. Table 5 summarizes the different approaches to information 
flow revealed in the within-case analyses. Next, our cross-case analysis will compare and contrast 
the four approaches to crisis response in terms of information intensity, information direction, and 
information reach. In so doing, we will abstract the concepts from the within-case analysis and 
develop a framework of four information network structures. 
 
Table 5. A Summary of the Different Approaches to Information Flow Revealed in the Within 
Case Analyses 
 
Role of IT in Crisis Response 
Communication across 
Relief Agencies Communication with Victims 
Communication with the 
Public 
SARS Case 
Crisis Management 
Systems (CMS) to 
manage flow of info from 
and to agencies 
Video cameras in the homes of 
the quarantined and telephones 
Daily press conferences, 
media Broadcasts, website 
Tsunami Case 
Ground info from relief 
teams sent by phone, 
email and fax to the 
center. Large bulletin 
board used to track info. 
Face-to-face (ground workers) Website updates 
Hurricane 
Katrina Case 
Technology silos with little 
cross-sharing of 
information 
Media coverage, telephone (but 
highly interrupted and 
overwhelmed), disaster 
information and postings on 
websites 
Residents formed their own 
"safe list" websites to update 
each other on the location of 
relatives 
Cyclone Nargis 
Case 
Government control over 
all media with restrictions 
on what information could 
be transmitted 
Scattered face-to-face meeting 
with the authorities 
Use of blogs and social media 
sites for the public to share 
images and information, but 
these were disallowed as 
soon as the government 
became aware of them 
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5. Cross-case Analysis: Theoretical Synthesis 
As depicted in Table 6 below, the four information network types derived from our analysis vary in the 
amount of information the network is able to process (information intensity), the direction of the flow of 
the information (top-down vs bottom-up), the overall reach of the information (density), and the role of 
the central organizational response agency. 
 
Table 6. The Four Crisis Response Network Structures 
 Information Intensity (Amount) 
Network Density 
(Reach) 
Direction of 
Information Flow 
Role of Central 
Response 
Organization 
Information Star High High Both top-down and bottom-up 
Central Information 
Hub 
Information Pyramid High Low Top-Down Information Gatekeeper 
Information Forest Low Low In silos There is no central organization 
Information Black-out Low High Top-Down Information Filter 
 
The network structure used by the SARS crisis response center is based on high information flow that 
reaches many stakeholders with little interference or manipulation (for political or other purposes) and 
flows in multiple directions, e.g., top-down as well as bottom-up. We label this an information star 
network. While there is a single focal organization at the center of the response structure, this 
organization does not filter the information or manipulate the information for political or other reasons; 
rather, this organization serves as a central hub and repository of information that flows to and from 
response partners and stakeholders. The response partners and stakeholders are considered crisis 
peers rather than subordinates. 
 
This star network structure depends upon an emergency management IS (Hiltz et al., 2010) that is 
greatly facilitated by a flexible and powerful IT infrastructure in the participating agencies (Jul, 2010) 
as well as by IT know-how and resources in the responding agencies. The SARS command center 
benefitted from its partnership with DSTA (Defense Science and Technology Agency), an agency that 
had experience developing applications for the military, partnerships with multiple IT providers, and 
strong leadership. Gathering the information was not easy, but quality information is essential to the 
performance of the star network structure. The team had to identify data sources, formats, and 
security issues associated with the reports contained in the crisis management system. As the CIO of 
DSTA recounted, “I was told it might be impossible to gather such data, but I approached the CIOs 
from various public sector agencies anyway, and they agreed to my requests." 
 
Whereas the star network can handle large amounts of information flowing across many agencies, 
the network structure used by Tzu Chi in Sri Lanka -- which we label the pyramid network -- does not 
allow for as much information reach. This may largely be a result of a lack of IT skills and resources 
needed to rapidly build an on-the-spot crisis management system to help manage the information 
needs. The information pyramid structure characterizes a response approach built around a relatively 
high information flow but relatively low density and a top-down tendency to information dissemination. 
In this structure, information is gathered by the central organization (as opposed to by independent 
agencies, as with the star) and sent to the supporting agencies for whom it is relevant. The pyramid 
structure eliminates delays caused by bureaucratic structures (Dantas & Seville, 2006) and allows 
information to be coordinated through a single body and quickly spread to others. 
 
In the pyramid network structure, the central node controls who has access to what information. 
However, this does not imply political motivations or information tampering; rather, the central node 
may simply be incapable of passing along information to all the involved stakeholders in an efficient 
manner and, thus, must exercise restraint. In fact, in crisis response situations involving agencies and 
stakeholders who depend largely on personal information channels rather than IT-based 
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communication channels, one might expect that the information pyramid is one of few viable options. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of this type of network depends upon the strength of the social relationships 
between the focal organization and its partners (Ghoshal et al., 1994). For example, although lacking 
in IT support and skills, the Tzu Chi was able to compensate with the close ties that it had developed 
with partner organizations during previous humanitarian missions. These previous joint missions 
helped Tzu Chi’s relief volunteers gain an understanding of humanitarian principles and the missions 
of other humanitarian agencies. As such, strong ties between Tzu Chi and its partners enabled the 
pyramid structure to succeed and helped compensate for the lack of systems to help in tracking and 
placement of aid supplies. This is consistent with existing literature that suggests strong ties are likely 
to promote high-quality information transfer between parties and serve as effective conduits of 
information (Rowley et al., 2000). 
 
In cases of a pre-existing strong relationships, the focal organization has strong influence over its 
partner organizations. Moreover, the partner organizations trust the information coming from the focal 
organization. The focal organization performs the role of a central information aggregator, combining 
information from its distributed partners. Unlike the information star that relies heavily upon IT to 
channel information, the information pyramid network usually consists of an association of people 
who share common beliefs bonded by altruism, self-interest in helping, and loyalty to an association. 
 
The third type of information network structure we observed can be called the forest information 
network. Like the pyramid, the forest has low information density, but in this case, the low density is not 
because strong existing relationships enable the handling of the crisis with a lower information flow (as 
in the case of the pyramid structure) but because poor existing relationships prevent high information 
flow across agencies that neither know each other well nor trust each other. The Hurricane Katrina crisis 
response provides an example of a forest information network. The city, state, and federal governments 
can each be viewed as a separate tree in the forest. Because the agencies do not have close working 
relationships, there was a tendency to put in place a tight structure in order to create a sense of order. 
However, this leads to adverse effects: tight command structures only work in emergency situations 
when there is a very clear, legitimate, and trusted central command organization. But because of 
disagreement as to which agency should be the central command organization, no central command 
organization emerges or has legitimacy. Prior studies contend that in such situations, a loosening, rather 
than tightening, of the command structure is preferable (Lin et al., 2006). 
 
In the information forest network, the structure can be seen as different entities having separate trees 
of communication with little communication across the trees. Missing in the information forest is a 
central organization that coordinates the flow of information throughout the response effort. The lack 
of a central organization might result from ill-defined response roles, from lack of credibility in the de 
facto central organization, or from disagreement about which should be the central organization. In 
such a network, information flow and density, while potentially high in a given entity, remain low in the 
larger network because of lack of coordination across major response entities. Disconnections 
between organizations form structural holes (Ahuja, 2000): Parties on either side of a structural hole 
circulate different flows of information with little or no information exchange between the two parties 
(Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). Common characteristics for this type of information network include 
formal consultation, deliberation, and complex accountability procedures for information transferred 
across entities. As such, organizational flexibility is compromised and crisis information is filtered 
through multiple layers. Ultimately this structure incurs delays in information processing time, 
information filtering, and information accessibility (Matheson & Tarjan, 1998). 
 
The last form of information network we observed is characterized by information manipulation, 
intentional blockage, and deceit. We refer to this as an information black-out network. The case of the 
Cyclone Nargis crisis illustrates this type of network. The black-out information network differs from both 
the information star and information pyramid networks in that the black-out has low information intensity: 
Little information is gathered and even less is distributed. Moreover, the central organization serves as 
an information filter -- not just deciding upon who sees what, but actively manipulating the information to 
serve its purposes. Unfortunately, this central organization may not act with the interest of the major 
crisis stakeholders in mind but rather acts out of concern for its own power. So while little information is 
effectively gathered and much is concealed from stakeholders, the information that is shared has a wide 
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reach in order to buttress the central organization's base of power. And unlike the star and pyramid 
networks in which the central organization viewed the stakeholders as peers in the response, in the 
black-out information network, the central organization is an authoritarian information filter to the extent 
that many stakeholders are afraid to gather or share information. Consequently, information flows 
between the focal and the partner organizations are minimized and, sometimes, non-existent. 
 
While the black-out model may be adopted for political reasons, the inability for critical information to 
flow between partner organizations may cause operations to fail (Matheson & Tarjan, 1998). With the 
media blackout, many residents may attempt to use blogs and social media sites for information 
dissemination. However, as seen in the case of Cyclone Nargis in Burma, a military government may 
utilize its control over the country’s Internet gateways to disable access to the Internet or to allow only 
intermittent periods of connectivity. Overall, the black-out model reduces the ability to scan the 
environment for new information and may increase the uncertainty and ambiguity of major 
stakeholders (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). 
6. Implications 
Our research has several implications for the role of IT in crisis response. Of the four information 
network structures, the star network has the greatest reach and is capable of processing the largest 
amount of information. This is in large part because the star network is enabled by a central, trusted 
crisis response organization and the crisis response organizers are able to rapidly improvise with IT 
(Kamoche, Cunha, & Cunha, 2003). For the star information network structure to work effectively and 
efficiently, the central response organizer must either have, or partner with, an agency that has a 
strong IT infrastructure, strong IT development skills, and partnerships with IT vendors. This IT 
agency must, in turn, be allowed to supervise all the information needs of the stakeholders involved in 
crisis response. Without such centralization and organization, the star information network is likely to 
degenerate into little more than un-actionable information and information overload. The finding is 
consistent with Turoff et al.‘s (2009) scale of group communication commitment that calls for full-scale 
collaboration on disaster management and response among crisis response organizations so as to 
generate real-time, effective disaster response decisions. The network’s ability to improvise in IT 
deployment hinges on its technical structure and social structure (Kamoche et al., 2003). The 
technical structure refers to the knowledge, skills, and abilities related to the techno-structural aspects 
of deploying IT. The social structure refers to the behavioral norms and communicative codes that 
regulate coordination and collective action in a given context. The star network structure suggests 
improvisation is an effective means of achieving agility in IT deployment, especially when confronted 
with resource constraints or time pressures. 
 
The role of IT in the pyramid structure is primarily for communication support among pre-existing 
partners. In fact, crisis response organizers can move from a pyramid structure to a star structure by 
investing time and resources in building a flexible IT infrastructure. This presupposes that the 
organizers have slack time between crises and slack resources. 
 
In the case of the forest information structure, IT is more of an inhibitor of effective crisis response 
than an enabler. Because there is no trusted, central crisis response organizer (as with the star and 
pyramid structures) and a lack of previous, close-working relationships among the agencies 
responding (as with the pyramid structure), the different IT infrastructures of the different responding 
agencies form a boundary. Current research is examining the best ways to integrate incompatible 
systems during extreme events, such as a crisis (Chen, Sharman, Chakravarti, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 
2008). It is possible that integration tools will be able to alleviate some of the bottlenecks implicit in 
the forest structure (Chen et al., 2008). Aside from integration tools, pre-crisis simulations might help 
government and humanitarian agencies learn to better coordinate. 
 
Last, the role of IT in the black-out information structure is largely as a saboteur: Social media and 
mobile technology can help disseminate information to stakeholders in spite of a central organizing 
body that either is incompetent or purposely tries to withhold information. In fact, Turoff et al. (2009, p. 
379) also point out that “online forums have allowed people to transcend geographical distances that 
normally constrain the reach of helping efforts, to share information and coordinate citizen-led efforts.” 
In this case, only the grassroots efforts of those close to the crisis could help gather and distribute 
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crisis-related information. This also entails improvising with IT, but on an individual rather than 
organizational level. The success of improvising with IT on an individual level, though, would depend 
on creativity, personality factors, cognitive factors, domain-relevant skills, and background factors 
(Magni, Proserpio, & Provera, 2006). 
 
Our paper makes several theoretical contributions. First, there is limited research that examines 
organizations’ response strategies during crises (Lin et al., 2006). This article addresses this very 
important issue and contributes to the growing crisis response research. Second, we extend crisis 
management research by integrating concepts from information flow and network research. Our 
reviews of the theories and crisis management research suggest that a reconceptualization of crisis 
management is needed from an information flows perspective (Hale et al., 2005; Majchrzak et al., 
2007). In this article, we offer a new perspective on examining how information is managed during 
crisis response. The prototypes we proposed offer a starting point for developing and coordinating 
different types of crisis information networks during crisis response. We believe the prototypical cases 
have the potential to explain crisis response phenomenon. Third, our study helps extend the nascent 
stream of research on IS in crisis response by looking at crisis response situations in which 
information flowed smoothly and crisis situations in which information flow was impeded. Whereas 
Day et al. (2009) identify the impediments to information flow during crisis response, our research 
presents evidence that information can flow effectively given the proper information network 
structures. Future research is needed to help understand why certain network structures are chosen 
and whether they can be modified mid-response. Fourth, our paper provides compelling evidence of 
the central role of IS resources in crisis responses. IS figure prominently as an asset (the IT 
infrastructure), a capability (development skills), and a transforming activity (resolute informing). 
While we concur with previous research about the important role played by IT infrastructure, IT know-
how and resources (Turoff et al., 2004; Turoff et al., 2009) and in establishing a trusting relationship 
based on previous IT collaborative projects (Pan et al., 2005), our finding of the ability of response 
organizations to rapidly improvise with IT that has an impact on information flow during crisis 
response is refreshing and adds value to the IS literature. 
 
Our study offers researchers a specific agenda for future research: particularly, to validate the four 
crisis response network structures in other crisis response contexts. Organizational scholars could 
reassess past crisis information management scenarios and try to fit the cases in one of the four 
information structures. They could even consider exploring new forms of crisis information networks. 
Another research direction could be to engage in a longitudinal study to understand if and how crisis 
information networks evolve over time. Such investigations may allow researchers to pinpoint factors 
that shape the evolution at different stages of crisis response. In this study, we emphasize the 
information flows within a crisis response network. Future research could expand the levels of 
analysis by including the individual level. An understanding of the communication among individuals 
may offer new perspectives on crisis information network structures. Given the important role played 
by IT and the time sensitive and ambiguous nature of crisis settings, possible further research hinges 
on the notion of improvisation with IT that impacts the information network structure. In particular, 
future research may explore how such improvisation may be conducted at both individual and 
organizational levels. 
 
While researchers theorize about crisis management, managers have a much more practical 
consideration. In every crisis response situation, organizations can consider developing and 
coordinating their information flows and networks based on one of the four types we proposed in this 
study. Below we provide a guide (refer to Table 7) for managers who may want to set up an 
information flow pattern and network for their organizations during crisis response. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed a framework of four crisis information networks by drawing upon social 
network and information flow theories. By understanding the dynamics of information flow and 
network structures, organizations can better manage information flows during crisis response. Our 
findings are based upon four crisis response cases. Our analysis revealed and derived four forms of 
information networks -- information star, information pyramid, information forest, and information 
black-out -- with various levels of information intensity and network density. By having a sound 
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information network structure (i.e., high network density and information intensity or low network 
density and high information intensity), organizations can distribute efficient crisis information. Our 
main contribution lies in conducting an exploratory study using an information network perspective to 
examine how information flows and networks are managed during crisis response. 
 
Table 7. A Step-by-Step Guide for Setting up Information Flow Network during Crisis 
Response 
Step 1: Locate Crisis Management Expertise. First step requires that managers locate the relevant crisis 
management expertise. It may be someone who has at least designed a crisis management plan or was 
personally involved in a crisis response operation. The person must be familiar with operating in a crisis 
response context and preferably has some links to other crisis relief organizations. In other words, organizations 
should identify potential leaders to lead the crisis response team. 
Step 2: Make an Initial Assessment. Second step requires the organization to assess its situated network 
structure. Particularly, whether the organization is a focal organization or partner organization? And which other 
organizations are involved? Having established the actors, the organization should consider its levels of network 
density and information intensity. A word of caution is that managers must keep a look out for changes in the 
network form, since the structure may evolve as time passes. Therefore, situated assessments may have to be 
performed at a later stage again. 
Step 3: Understand Organizational Factors that may Affect the Network Structure. Step 3 requires that 
organizations assess the organizational factors that may shape crisis information networks. Here, managers 
examine whether the organization is connected to other partner organizations and if yes, to what extent? And 
what is the level of inter-organizational trust established between response organizations? Does the organization 
single-handedly process and control the information inflows or is there more than one information gatekeeper? 
Find out whether the organization owns sufficient IT resources and capabilities. Evaluate the information 
network’s IT readiness and the connectivity between organizations. If the IT readiness is high, the organization 
may consider leveraging on IT to distribute crisis information. Finally, examine the relative power positions within 
the network. Who has the real power? By considering the power relationships, organizations may devise an 
appropriate information flow strategy taking into account the power imbalances. 
Step 4: Select an Information Network Structure. This step requires organizations to select an information 
network prototype suitable for them. While there may not always be a clear-cut case, organizations should select 
the most probable quadrants to which they belong. Once the quadrant is established, the organization may 
proceed to implement the respective information flow strategy. For example, if the information star approach is 
selected, the organization should align its crisis management plan with its information systems strategy by 
leveraging its advanced information infrastructure and applications to collect, process, store, and distribute crisis 
information efficiently. 
Step 5: Migrate the Network. Finally, the information forest and black-out organizations should consider 
migrating to the quadrants of information star or information pyramid eventually if they are not already there. The 
reason is that these two quadrants provide an efficient flow of crisis information. For example, if the organization 
is located in the black-out quadrant and wishes to relocate, managers should identify and assess the inherent 
structural holes and broker for improved relationships between organizations to establish adequate 
communication links. 
 
The results should be viewed within the context of the study’s limitations. First, of the four case data 
collected in this study, two were gathered based on secondary documentation. As such, there may be 
the presence of interpretation bias. While this bias may be a shortcoming in this paper, it must be 
noted here that our results are in line with findings from existing crisis management studies. This 
suggests the generalizability of our findings and observations to theory and their usefulness for 
theory-building. Furthermore, to substantiate the reasons why more crisis response cases were not 
studied, it is generally known that crisis situations may involve loss of lives and valuables, and are 
sensitive topics, making it difficult for researchers to obtain case access. Second, it should be noted 
that Tzu Chi’s efforts in response to the Sri Lanka Tsunami crisis might have been affected by the fact 
that it was not central to the network of agencies coordinated by the Sri Lankan government, unlike 
our other three cases, which all reflected responses by the governments of the countries affected. 
Despite the limitations, we believe our study will appeal to organizations in both the public and private 
sectors that are directly involved in handling emergency situations. By understanding how information 
flows may be best managed during crisis response and how information systems can enable or 
constrain information network structures, crisis-response organizations will be better able to manage 
the flow of crisis information. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Excerpts of Interview Topic Guides 
Case of SARS Crisis 
• Organizational and departmental characteristics (e.g. number of people, number of departments 
and formal organizations). 
• Describe the crisis management protocols and practices in the government agencies. 
• Please provide the background information of the crisis response efforts (who initiated the 
response, its objective, who was involved, the response scope?).  
• How did you identify your stakeholders? Understand stakeholders’ varying perceptions toward the 
crisis response. Identify the differences in the opinion towards crisis response. 
• Did the response teams have adequate access to organizational resources? What resources were 
provided? How were existing resources deployed to support this? Were there new resources 
deployed?  
• How were crisis response groups organized? How group members were selected? 
• Did the agencies develop any capabilities from utilizing the resources? Were the capabilities and 
resources leveraged to fulfill the objective of crisis response?  
• When handling crisis response initiative, how were processes, personnel deployment and rescue 
services formulated? How did the response agencies acquire related crisis response knowledge? 
Was information technology leveraged? What role did the information technology play in crisis 
response? How did the response agencies win stakeholders’ trust?  
• What factors were taken into consideration when selecting various information technology 
applications and tools? What were the challenges faced during system set up and deployment? 
How was coordination with software vendors and users achieved in terms of communication and 
the understanding of requirements and system compatibility? 
• How did Singapore handle and respond to any extraordinary and unexpected situations that 
caused disruptions to crisis response? What were the challenges faced when integrating various 
information systems? 
• During crisis response, which portion did you consider to be the most difficult? How were the 
problems resolved? During initial phase of crisis response, did the coordination proceed well? How 
were problems resolved? 
• How did the agencies store and transfer crisis related information during crisis response? Were the 
information collection, exchange and processing processes effective? 
• How did the agencies store and transfer any knowledge created during crisis response?  
• How were the relationships between the agencies, and between the agencies and other NGOs? 
How did they cooperate with one another in the crisis relief activities? 
Case of Tzu Chi 
• Have you ever joined any overseas relief project? Which is most impressive one to you and why? 
• What do you think are the main reasons that Tzu Chi has been participating in overseas relief 
actively since 1990? 
• Does Tzu Chi have overseas relief manuals?  
• How does Tzu Chi establish relationship with overseas countries? How does Tzu Chi gain local 
trust? How does Tzu Chi respond to local government? 
• What are the relationships between Tzu Chi and other Non-governmental organizations?  
• What is the level of corporation in international relief activities? 
• Have you participated in the Sri Lanka Tsunami Relief Project? What were your responsibilities 
(i.e., domestic affairs, overseas affairs, logistics, and ground force)? 
• How to exchange information between ground team and Taiwan Headquarters? 
• Was Tzu Chi effective in information collection, exchange and processing? Why? 
• How did Tzu Chi train the relief project group members? 
• How to select personnel to join the relief project group? How to select the leader 
• How was Tzu Chi able to react to disaster so quickly? 
• What were the areas for improvement in the Sri Lanka Relief Project? 
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Appendix B. Excerpts of Data Sources related to Hurricane Katrina Crisis 
Response 
Government Websites 
US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
http://www.FEMA.gov/. 
 
Ready. http://www.ready.gov/. 
 
US Department of Health and Human Services. 
http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/emergency/naturaldisasters/hurricanes/katrina/index.html. 
 
Hurricane Katrina.com. http://www.hurricanekatrina.com/. 
 
US Government. http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/PublicSafety/Hurricane_Katrina_Recovery.shtml. 
News Reports 
Laforet, L. (2010, August 25). Hurricane Katrina. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/h/hurricane_katrina/index.html. 
 
Special Report (2005, August 29). Voices from the Gulf Coast.  CNN. Retrieved from 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2005/katrina/. 
 
Special Report (2007, August 29). The Guardian. Hurricane Katrina. Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/katrina/0,,1560620,00.html. 
 
Special Report (2005, September 9). ABC News. Katrina Recovery Effort Delayed, may Hinder 
Identification Process. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/HurricaneKatrina/. 
Journal Articles 
Hurley-Hanson, A. (2006). Organizational responses and adaptations after 9-11. Management 
Research News, 29(8), 480-494. 
Schneider, S. (2005). Administrative breakdowns in the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Public Administration Review, 65(5), 515-516. 
Palen, L., Hiltz, R., & Liu, S. (2007). Online forums supporting grassroots participation in emergency 
preparedness and response. Communications of the ACM, 50(3), 54-58. 
Rodriguez, H., Trainor, J., & Quarantelli, E. (2006). Rising to the challenges of a catastrophe: The 
emergent and prosocial behavior following Hurricane Katrina. The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 82-101. 
Boin, A., & McConnell, A. (2007). Preparing for critical infrastructure breakdowns: The limits of crisis 
management and the need for resilience. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 
15(1), 50-59. 
Kates, R., Colten, C., Laska, S., & Leatherman, S. (2006). Reconstruction of New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina: A research perspective. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
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